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The UK, the EU and European Security: A German Perspective 
 
Ronja Kempin and Jocelyn Mawdsley 
 
While German commentators and politicians are primarily concerned with the 
economic impact of a possible ‘Brexit’ and the loss of a partner in EU economic 
negotiations, Cameron’s speech has also raised questions about the future of European 
security. For some in Berlin, the CSDP is unworkable without British participation; for 
others, the removal of the British veto would enable progress on CSDP institutions, long 
desired by Berlin. Here, Kempin and Mawdsley explore the apparent contradictions in 
German security policy, and the (possibly unwelcome) opportunities a Brexit might 
open up for Germany in relation to the CSDP. 
 
David Cameron’s January 2013 speech on the future of Britain’s relationship with the 
European Union was not well-received in Berlin. Despite comparatively cordial relations 
between Cameron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, there seems to be a diminishing 
understanding among the political elites in Berlin and London of each other’s positions on 
EU politics. The British government has chosen to isolate itself from an economic ally on 
austerity policies and to cast doubt on Germany’s vision for the future of the European Union 
at a time when Berlin is highly sensitive to any criticism of its leadership within the EU. 
Arguably, such misunderstanding is not new: since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992 
it is difficult to think of many occasions when Britain and Germany have had shared 
priorities regarding the EU, with the brief exception of the early years of the Blair and 
Schröder governments. 
 
The lack of comprehension between the two states is not, however, confined solely to the 
future of the EU, and is perhaps at its most stark in relation to security and defence policy, 
where on almost every single regional debate in the last decade, Britain and Germany have 
found themselves on opposing sides. Examples of such discord have ranged from elements of 
specific military interventions such as Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya to strategic judgments 
such as the future of nuclear deterrence, armed forces reform and defence industrial 
restructuring. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, what Karl Kaiser and John Roper once 
characterised as ‘the silent alliance’ (‘die stille Allianz’) in their 1987 book has not just been 
quiet, but frequently absent.
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These strategic disagreements are rooted in a continuing dissonance between German 
security calculations and those of its key allies.  
 
German security policy in the post-Cold War era has been characterised by a near continuous 
reform programme for its armed forces, culminating in the suspension of conscription in 
2011. Despite the reforms, the strategic purpose of the armed forces remains unclear. 
Although some commentators have viewed the reform process as signalling a ‘normalisation’ 
of German security policy towards a societal and political acceptance of the need to use 
military force in some circumstances, increasingly it seems as though the commitment to 
military intervention overseas expressed by the Schröder-Fischer government was in fact an 
exception. In 2013, Germany is a state that is still profoundly uneasy about the use of military 
force, does not feel militarily threatened – even by Russia – and conceives of its national 
interests in geo-economic rather than geopolitical terms.
2
  
 
In light of this situation, German commentators and politicians are primarily concerned with 
the economic impacts of a ‘Brexit’, and the loss of a partner in EU negotiations with which 
they share many economic policy positions. However, Cameron’s speech has also led to 
questions about the future of European security. As Miskimmon and Roper argue, the two 
strategic triangles influencing British-German security relations (Britain, France and 
Germany, and Britain, the United States and Germany) identified by Kaiser and Roper 
remain relevant and, indeed, important to an understanding of the situation, but have been 
complicated further by changing patterns of European security co-operation.
3
 This article will 
look briefly at German reactions to Prime Minister Cameron’s speech, and then analyse the 
opportunities and problems that it brings for Germany in terms of bilateral relations with both 
Britain and France, and with regard to the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and 
NATO. 
 
German Reaction to Cameron’s Speech 
Initial German reaction to David Cameron’s speech was at once dismissive and angry. The 
foreign minister, Guido Westerwelle, stated that Britain could not treat Europe as an à la 
carte menu, picking and choosing the policies it liked. Meanwhile, Martin Schulz, the 
German president of the European Parliament, angrily and rather unfairly claimed that Britain 
was ʻoverwhelmingly to blame for all the delays in Europe’.4 In general, opinion across the 
German political parties was that Britain had isolated itself, was unlikely to succeed in its 
ambitions for treaty renegotiation and that if the state were to leave the EU, it would cause 
more harm to itself more than to the EU.
5
 Although Angela Merkel’s response was more 
conciliatory, Berlin has since refused to take part in the British review of the balance of 
competences, suggesting again that the calculation in Berlin is that London is too isolated to 
be able to push through any treaty renegotiation.
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It is true that Euroscepticism is growing among the German population
7
 (especially in 
relation to the Eurozone bailouts), while March 2013 saw the launch of a new Eurosceptic 
political party, ‘Alternative for Germany’. However, for almost all of Germany’s political 
elite, the cross-party consensus that ‘more Europe’ is invariably a good thing remains intact. 
As such, Cameron’s intention to seek a renegotiation of British EU membership, and to put 
such a deal to a UK electorate in a referendum, has been received with both bemusement and 
indignation. 
 
Nevertheless, the prospect of an EU without Britain is causing some concern among German 
policy-makers and commentators. Much attention has been paid to the fact that Britain has 
been a useful ally for Germany on EU budget negotiations, and that both states share a 
preference for free market economics. Many, such as think-tank expert Almut Möller, 
however, have also commented ruefully that an EU without the UK would leave the vision of 
an EU defence community in tatters, as any attempt to establish one would lack credibility.
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According to German MEP Alexander Graf Lambsdorff (of the German Free Democratic 
Party – FDP), for example, ʻLondon has to be a part of any European Common Foreign and 
Security Policy for it to be taken seriously’.9 German defence minister, Thomas de Maizière, 
also argues that a Brexit would not just damage the UK’s military standing but would weaken 
NATO.
10
 In fact, the prospect of a Britain disengaged from the EU or – worse still – a Brexit 
raises some real security concerns for Germany. 
 
The Broken Triangle: German, French and British Trilateral Relations 
The difficulties for Germany really reflect the changing shape of trilateral security relations 
between the UK, France and Germany. While more generally in EU politics Germany is 
dominant, France weakened and Britain isolated, this does not hold in the sphere of European 
security. While the three countries have rarely acted as a trio on security policy (EU action on 
Iran being a recent exception), during the Cold War Franco-German and British-German 
security relations were good. From 1963 onwards, with the signing of the Elysée Treaty, in 
security and defence policy, Germany’s main European ally has always been France, despite 
a reliable if unspectacular Cold War alliance with Britain, based on joint procurement, 
agreement on the role of NATO, and army links through the large number of British soldiers 
stationed in West Germany (all of which are weaker today).
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 Although France and Germany 
have long had very different security cultures – Berlin cultivating its ʻpolicy of restraint’, 
while Paris used every occasion to show its military power – both states could agree on 
projects fostering European integration in security and defence politics, such as the creation 
of the Franco-German Brigade in 1987 and the decision to found Europe’s largest aerospace 
and defence corporation EADS through the merger of French, German and Spanish aircraft 
manufacturers. 
 
The last decade, however, has seen the clashes between a reticent German security culture 
and the more interventionist cultures of the UK and France become more overt. The Berlin-
Paris axis began to weaken significantly in 2008. Although France had already begun the 
process of returning to NATO’s integrated military structures (without consulting Germany), 
Paris used its tenure of the EU Council presidency in the second half of 2008 to advocate its 
great ambitions for the development of the CSDP – and it expected support from Berlin in 
this regard. However, President Nicolas Sarkozy’s flagship CSDP proposals – a revision 
of the European Security Strategy and the further development of military capabilities – 
failed, not least because of Germany’s reticence on such matters. In 2010 and 2012, efforts 
made by the two defence ministries to work more closely on developing military capabilities 
went nowhere. This, combined with the Germany abstention at the UN on the Libyan 
intervention and its reluctance to become involved in the French Mali mission in early 2013, 
have meant that London is increasingly preferred as a partner on defence matters by Paris
12
. 
France and Britain have come to co-operate much more closely, most noticeably in military 
interventions such as that in Libya, but also on military procurement, research and industrial 
policy. The 2010 Franco-British Lancaster House Agreements are viewed as the most far-
reaching example of pooling and sharing in Europe.
13
 Nevertheless, it is generally assumed 
that if Britain were to leave the EU, or to disengage from the CSDP, the French would 
abandon bilateral co-operation in favour of the CSDP,
14
 thereby opening up opportunities for 
Germany. It remains to be seen, however, whether Germany would be both able and willing 
to return to an exclusive partnership with France. 
 
In some areas, it is clear that Germany would be keen to do so. Like other European defence 
industrial powers, Germany has viewed the growing Franco-British co-operation on defence 
research and development with unease.
15
 It is generally agreed in Berlin thatthe German veto 
of the proposed merger between BAE Systems and EADS was also based on fears of loss of 
influence and jobs.
16
 However, Germany remains uncomfortable with French attitudes 
towards military intervention, whether under the auspices of the CSDP or NATO. On the 
other hand, the French feel that Germany’s unreliability and unpredictability as a partner in 
military interventions limits the bilateral potential of pooling and sharing resources. 
Moreover, France, like the UK, is frustrated by its EU partners with regards to what it sees as 
a failing CSDP. If Germany were to want to play a leading role in the CSDP, it would need to 
clarify its stance on the policy and find common ground with France. A possible British 
disengagement could open a window of opportunity for Berlin to launch a new, integration-
oriented CSDP agenda. 
 Germany: A Leader in a CSDP without Britain? 
Britain has, without doubt, been an important player in the establishment and development of 
the CSDP, frequently in partnership with France. Tony Blair’s Labour government supported 
not just the initial Franco-British St Malo declaration, in 1998, but also a number of 
initiatives intended to build a common strategic thinking, to improve the military capabilities 
of the UK’s European partners and to increase the number of European troops that can be 
deployed abroad.
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 In 2003, London actively supported the drafting of the European Security 
Strategy. One year later, it played a key role in the formation of the European Defence 
Agency as well as in the creation of the EU Battlegroups. Finally, the UK has actively 
supported CSDP missions and operations. During the UK’s presidency of the European 
Council in the second half of 2005, more CSDP operations were launched than during any 
other presidency before or since.
18
 However, Britain pursued this European option less out of 
a desire for EU autonomy, and more in the belief that if Europeans did not contribute more to 
NATO, then the Alliance would not survive; the UK always saw CSDP as a separate but 
complementary structure to NATO.
19
 In this regard, Britain has been frustrated by its EU 
partners’ refusal to take strategic capability gaps seriously and by their preference for 
institution-building rather than action, and latterly has exhibited a preference for bilateral co-
operation with the French as well as scepticism towards both existing and potential CSDP 
institutions. This has led to the paradox that the CSDP, as envisaged by its supporters, cannot 
work with the UK but nor can it work without it.
20
 Furthermore, the initiatives that the UK 
has chosen to support were judged on ‘their individual merits and potential rewards’ but this 
is not really a viable long-term strategy for a credible CSDP.
21
 
 
In contrast to the UK, Germany’s approach to the CSDP has prioritised institution-building. 
For example, Berlin has consistently supported a permanent operational headquarters with 
planning capacities, which London has always vetoed. A CSDP without the UK would thus 
mean that the more institutional agenda promoted by the Weimar Group (the co-operation 
framework between Germany, Poland and France) could come to fruition. The German 
project of a common European army might also become more plausible. It would, in short, 
offer an opportunity for German leadership in the foreign- and security-policy field, just as it 
currently leads in Eurozone politics, without its preferences being blocked by Britain. 
However, this assumes that Germany would want such a CSDP leadership role. 
 
In truth, whereas the British vision for the CSDP is clear (encompassing low-level 
intervention capabilities coupled with the resources that would allow Europeans to shoulder 
their share of the NATO burden), it is difficult to understand what the Germans really want 
the CSDP to do. The state remains uncomfortable with external military intervention, putting 
it increasingly at odds with the French over their more activist interpretation of the CSDP. 
Some Brussels commentators also point to a German tendency to express strong support for 
initiatives, but then to be unwilling to implement them in practice, notably with respect to the 
Ghent Framework on pooling and sharing.
22
 It is unclear whether this is because of 
discomfort at the possibility of being tied into commitments where military intervention may 
occur, or unwillingness to surrender national autonomy. A CSDP without the UK would offer 
Germany opportunities to lead, but it would also require considerable commitments that the 
Germans may be unwilling to offer. As a consequence, hopes for closer Franco-German co-
operation in security and defence policy might be overly optimistic.  
 
The Impact on NATO 
A Brexit would be even more detrimental to the UK’s interests and position in NATO. If 
Britain were to isolate itself further within the EU or to leave it entirely, it is likely to also 
have an impact on NATO, although it is unclear, at present, how this might be manifested. 
On the one hand, it may speed up plans on the part of the United States to reorient its security 
priorities towards the Pacific. Furthermore, the US has made it clear that the ‘special 
relationship’ with the UK would be devalued if it were no longer a central power within the 
EU.
23
 Given that the UK is generally viewed as the Americans’ most important partner within 
NATO, this could undermine the Alliance. On the other hand, it could have the reverse effect 
and reinvigorate the European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO, if the 
other European NATO members, particularly France, were to prioritise maintaining co-
operation with the British over developing EU autonomy, in order to maximise operational 
capability. This might harden the divide between a CSDP for ‘soft’ security concerns and 
reliance on NATO in ‘hard’ security matters. Britain would also likely favour an active ESDI 
in the event that it leaves the EU. 
 
The question then is what these options would mean for Germany. As Patrick Keller has 
argued, although Germany was a staunch supporter of NATO during the Cold War and later 
in its eastward enlargement, it is generally considered to be uncomfortable with the changes 
in NATO’s strategic posture over the last two decades.24 In this case, a devaluation of NATO 
might remove a security-policy problem for Germany, as its failure to meet the expectations 
of its allies, particularly in Afghanistan and on military spending, has been politically  
difficult. Germany is viewed by its NATO allies as militarily weak, and unable to offer the 
leadership that might have been expected from a state with such significant economic power. 
It has cut military spending considerably since the end of the Cold War, and although large-
scale military reforms have been undertaken, military intervention remains problematic for 
Germany. Indeed, the Atlantic Council has claimed that Germany’s military weakness is 
NATO’s most significant problem.25 Many German commentators agree that Germany is 
increasingly side-lined within NATO.
26
 However, while Germany might be uncomfortable 
with NATO today, it is unlikely to hope for its abolition. In many ways, the existence of a 
credible NATO permits Germany to continue to avoid the need to take on military leadership 
within Europe, something that it is not enthusiastic about doing. 
 
A reinvigorated ESDI on the other hand would be a poor fit for Germany’s preferences for 
the institutional development of the CSDP. The checks and balances within the CSDP allow 
Germany much more room for manoeuvre to avoid military action that it does not want to 
participate in. As Lothar Rühl argues, Germany learnt a salutary lesson over Libya, namely, 
that within NATO it can be completely bypassed.
27
 Germany’s opposition to intervention in 
Libya is also thought to have further undermined its credibility as a NATO member,
28
 
particularly as German policy towards NATO is often unclear and somewhat contradictory, 
meaning that the state is unlikely to welcome a reactivated ESDI which might see its 
influence in this regard decline even further. 
 
Conclusions 
Although a British disengagement from the EU or even a Brexit offer opportunities for 
Germany, with respect to leadership on European foreign and security policy, it is not clear 
that these are opportunities that Germany would want or be able to take up. Germany’s 
continuing reticence regarding out-of-area military intervention puts it at odds with its 
obvious partner, France, in developing a strategically credible CSDP. In many ways the status 
quo of Franco-British leadership in European security questions suits the German preference 
for military inaction, in spite of German concerns about loss of influence. If NATO were to 
regain importance through a Brexit, then it is likely that Germany would be further relegated 
in significance as a security and defence actor. If, as a result of the British actions, the US 
were to disengage further, then this would force Germany to take action. 
 
German security policy currently lacks clear priorities and preferences and this, coupled with 
a lack – compared to Britain and France – of operational capability, leaves it ill-suited to 
exercising the same sort of leadership on European foreign and security policy that it does on 
regional economic policy. While German politicians are undoubtedly correct to argue that a 
British withdrawal or a renegotiation of some class of sub-membership of the EU would 
damage the UK considerably, they are also correct to be concerned about what this would 
mean for European security. It would almost inevitably require Germany to make some 
difficult political decisions about whether or not to substitute for Britain in its leadership role 
in this regard. However, the disruption that may result from British decisions about the EU 
may also break the stasis that has also prevailed for some time now because of the 
contradictory British, French and German agendas on European security, thereby allowing 
progress to be made. 
 
Ronja Kempin is Head of the research division ‘EU External Relations’ at the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs. Prior to this, she was Fritz Thyssen Fellow at 
Harvard University, and Research Fellow at the Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, the 
Institut des Relations Internationales et Stratégiques in Paris as well as the German 
Bundestag. 
 
Jocelyn Mawdsley is a Senior Lecturer in European Politics at the University of Newcastle 
upon Tyne. She has published widely on the political economy of defence and security in 
Europe, and also on the bilateral and trilateral security relations between Britain, France 
and Germany.  
 
Notes 
                                                          
1
 Karl Kaiser and John Roper (eds.), Die Stille Allianz: Deutsch-Britische Sicherheitskooperation (Bonn: Europa 
Union Verlag, 1987). Kaiser and Roper described the British-German security relationship as the silent alliance 
from the 1960s to the end of the Cold War. 
2
 Hans Kundnani, ‘Germany as a Geo-economic Power’, Washington Quarterly (Vol. 34, No. 3, Summer 2011).  
3
 Alister Miskimmon and John Roper, ‘The Stille Allianz Revisited’, in Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and Stephen 
Padgett (eds.), Rethinking Germany and Europe: Democracy and Diplomacy in a Semi-Sovereign State 
(Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
4
 Stephen Brown and Mark John, ‘Selfish, Ignorant, Dangerous: Europe's Anger over Cameron Speech’, Reuters, 
23 January 2013. 
5
 Gunther Krichbaum quoted in Stefanie Bolzen and Tina Kaiser, ‘Allein auf der Insel - So sähen die Briten ohne 
EU aus‘, Die Welt, 23 January 2013; Martin Schulz, quoted in Die Welt, ‘Ohne Reform treibt Großbritannien auf 
den Ausstieg zu‘, welt.de, 23 January 2013, <http://www.welt.de/politik/ausland/article113070836/Ohne-
Reform-treibt-Grossbritannien-auf-Ausstieg-zu.html> accessed 8 July 2013; Joschka Fischer ‘Europa steht in 
Flammen‘ Joschka Fischer, ‘Cameron sollte Churchill lesen!‘, sueddeutsche.de, 23 January 2013, 
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/rede-zur-europaeischen-union-cameron-sollte-churchill-lesen-
1.1580707>, accessed 8 July 2013. 
6
 Honor Mahoney, ‘France and Germany Snub Cameron on EU Law Review’, EUobserver.com, 2 April 2013, 
<http://euobserver.com/political/119644>, accessed 4 July 2013. 
7
 Jose Ignacio Torreblanca and Mark Leonard, ‘The continent-wide rise of Euroscepticism’, ECFR Policy Memo 
79 ( May 2013), <http://ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR79_EUROSCEPTICISM_BRIEF_AW.pdf>, accessed 8 July 2013. 
8
 Deutsche Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik (DGAP), ‘Großbritannien: Streit um Europa’, 7 February 2013, 
<https://dgap.org/de/gesellschaft/die-gesellschaft/dgapinfo/gro%C3%9Fbritannien-streit-um-europa>, 
accessed 4 July 2013. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
9
 Stefanie Bolzen and Tina Kaiser, ‘Allein auf der Insel - So sähen die Briten ohne EU aus‘, Die Welt, 23 January 
2013. 
10
 Nick Hopkins, ‘UK Would Jeopardise Military Standing by Leaving EU, Says German Minister’, Guardian, 22 
April 2013. 
11
 Further reading: Philip H. Gordon, France, Germany, and the Western Alliance (Boulder: Westerview Press, 
1994); Patrick A. McCarthy, France-Germany, 1983-1993: The Struggle to Cooperate (Houndmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 1994); Karl Kaiser and John Roper (eds.), Die Stille Allianz; R Gerald Hughes, Britain, Germany and 
the Cold War:The Search for a European Détente 1949-1967 (London: Routledge, 2007). 
12
 Further reading: Alister Miskimmon, ‘Germany Foreign Policy and the Libya Crisis’, German Politics, (Vol. 21, 
No. 4, 2012); Bruce D. Jones, ‘Libya and the Responsibilities of Power’, Survival (Vol 53, No. 3); Cornelius Vogt, 
‘Weimar Triangle on Mali: Germany’, IP Journal Blog, <https://ip-journal.dgap.org/en/blog/eye-
europe/weimar-triangle-mali-germany>, accessed 8 July 2013; Matthias Gebauer and Philipp Wittrock, 
‘Germany's Mali Predicament: Trapped Between France and War’, spiegel.de, 
<http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/french-mission-in-mali-puts-germany-in-a-tight-spot-a-
878187.html>, accessed 8 July 2013. 
13
 Ronja Kempin, Jocelyn Mawdsley and Stefan Steinicke, ‘Entente Cordiale: Eine erste Bilanz französisch-
britischer Zusammenarbeit in der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik’, DGAP-analyse No. 10, August 2012. 
14
 Sven Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence: Leading or Leaving?’, International Affairs (Vol. 88, No. 6, 
November 2012). 
15
 Kempin, Mawdsley and Steinicke, ‘Entente Cordiale‘. 
16
 Dan Milmo, Kate Conolly and Kim Willsher, ‘Angela Merkel blocks BAE/EADS merger over small German 
share’, Guardian, 10 October 2012. 
17
 Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence’ 
18
 David Lidington, ‘EU Common Security and Defence Policy: The UK Perspective’, speech delivered in Paris, 27 
June 2012, <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/eu-common-security-and-defence-policy-the-uk-
perspective>, accessed 4 July 2013. 
19
 Clara Marina O’Donnell, ‘Britain and France Should Not Give Up on EU Defence Co-operation’, Centre for 
European Reform Policy Brief, October 2011. 
20
 Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence’. 
21
 Philip Worré, ‘The Consequences of a British Exit from the EU and CSDP: An Analytical Timeline’, ISIS Europe 
and NATO Watch Occasional Paper, January 2013, p. 3. 
22
 Biscop, ‘The UK and European Defence’. 
23
 Julian Borger, Ian Traynor and Nicholas Watt, ‘Britain Should Stay in European Union, Says Obama 
Administration’, Guardian, 10 January 2013. 
24
 Patrick Keller, ‘Germany in NATO: The Status Quo Ally’, Survival (Vol. 54, No. 3, June–July 2012). 
25
 R Nicholas Burns, Damon Wilson and Jeff Lightfoot, Anchoring the Alliance (Washington, DC: Atlantic 
Council, 2012). 
26
 Johannes Varwick and Martin Schmid, ‘Perspektiven für die deutsche Nato-Politik’, Aus Politik und 
Zeitgeschichte (Vol. 62, No. 10, March 2012). 
27
 Lothar Rühl, ‘Deutschland und der Libyenkrieg’, Zeitschrift für Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik (Vol. 4, No. 4, 
October 2011). 
28
 Helen Pidd, ‘Germans voice disquiet over absence from Libya military action’, Guardian, 24 March 2011; Eric 
Westervelt, ‘NATO's Intervention In Libya: A New Model?’, npr.org, 12 September 2011, 
<http://www.npr.org/2011/09/12/140292920/natos-intervention-in-libya-a-new-model>, accessed 8 July 
2013. 
